CVE-2025-39886
Published: Sep 23, 2025
Modified: May 11, 2026
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Tell memcg to use allow_spinning=false path in bpf_timer_init() Currently, calling bpf_map_kmalloc_node() from __bpf_async_init() can cause various locking issues; see the following stack trace (edited for style) as one example: ... [10.011566] do_raw_spin_lock.cold [10.011570] try_to_wake_up (5) double-acquiring the same [10.011575] kick_pool rq_lock, causing a hardlockup [10.011579] __queue_work [10.011582] queue_work_on [10.011585] kernfs_notify [10.011589] cgroup_file_notify [10.011593] try_charge_memcg (4) memcg accounting raises an [10.011597] obj_cgroup_charge_pages MEMCG_MAX event [10.011599] obj_cgroup_charge_account [10.011600] __memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook [10.011603] __kmalloc_node_noprof ... [10.011611] bpf_map_kmalloc_node [10.011612] __bpf_async_init [10.011615] bpf_timer_init (3) BPF calls bpf_timer_init() [10.011617] bpf_prog_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx_fcg_runnable [10.011619] bpf__sched_ext_ops_runnable [10.011620] enqueue_task_scx (2) BPF runs with rq_lock held [10.011622] enqueue_task [10.011626] ttwu_do_activate [10.011629] sched_ttwu_pending (1) grabs rq_lock ... The above was reproduced on bpf-next (b338cf849ec8) by modifying ./tools/sched_ext/scx_flatcg.bpf.c to call bpf_timer_init() during ops.runnable(), and hacking the memcg accounting code a bit to make a bpf_timer_init() call more likely to raise an MEMCG_MAX event. We have also run into other similar variants (both internally and on bpf-next), including double-acquiring cgroup_file_kn_lock, the same worker_pool::lock, etc. As suggested by Shakeel, fix this by using __GFP_HIGH instead of GFP_ATOMIC in __bpf_async_init(), so that e.g. if try_charge_memcg() raises an MEMCG_MAX event, we call __memcg_memory_event() with @allow_spinning=false and avoid calling cgroup_file_notify() there. Depends on mm patch "memcg: skip cgroup_file_notify if spinning is not allowed": https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ v0 approach s/bpf_map_kmalloc_node/bpf_mem_alloc/ https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ v1 approach: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
Linux | Linux | affected b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 - < 449682e76f32601f211816d3e2100bed87e67a4caffected b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 - < cd1fd26bb13473c1734e3026b2b97025a0a4087baffected b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 - < ac70cd446f83ccb25532b343919ab86eacdcd06aaffected b00628b1c7d595ae5b544e059c27b1f5828314b4 - < 6d78b4473cdb08b74662355a9e8510bde09c511e |
Linux | Linux | affected 5.15unaffected 0 - < 5.15unaffected 6.6.107 - <= 6.6.*unaffected 6.12.48 - <= 6.12.*unaffected 6.16.8 - <= 6.16.*+1 more versions |
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