CWE Database
/

CWE-1319

Back to CWE list

CWE-1319

Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)

Base
Incomplete

Description

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

{"xhtml:p":["Electromagnetic fault injection may allow an attacker to locally and dynamically modify the signals (both internal and external) of an integrated circuit. EM-FI attacks consist of producing a local, transient magnetic field near the device, inducing current in the device wires. A typical EMFI setup is made up of a pulse injection circuit that generates a high current transient in an EMI coil, producing an abrupt magnetic pulse which couples to the target producing faults in the device, which can lead to:"],"xhtml:ul":[{"xhtml:li":["Bypassing security mechanisms such as secure JTAG or Secure Boot","Leaking device information","Modifying program flow","Perturbing secure hardware modules (e.g. random number generators)"]}]}

Parent Weaknesses (ChildOf)

Common Consequences

Scope

Confidentiality
Integrity
Access Control
Availability

Impact

Modify Memory, Read Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Potential Mitigations

Architecture and Design
Implementation

1. Redundancy - By replicating critical operations and comparing the two outputs can help indicate whether a fault has been injected. 2. Error detection and correction codes - Gay, Mael, et al. proposed a new scheme that not only detects faults injected by a malicious adversary but also automatically corrects single nibble/byte errors introduced by low-multiplicity faults. 3. Fail by default coding - When checking conditions (switch or if) check all possible cases and fail by default because the default case in a switch (or the else part of a cascaded if-else-if construct) is used for dealing with the last possible (and valid) value without checking. This is prone to fault injection because this alternative is easily selected as a result of potential data manipulation [REF-1141]. 4. Random Behavior - adding random delays before critical operations, so that timing is not predictable. 5. Program Flow Integrity Protection - The program flow can be secured by integrating run-time checking aiming at detecting control flow inconsistencies. One such example is tagging the source code to indicate the points not to be bypassed [REF-1147]. 6. Sensors - Usage of sensors can detect variations in voltage and current. 7. Shields - physical barriers to protect the chips from malicious manipulation.

CVE-2020-27211

Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus and does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319) which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419) leading the product to be in an unprotected state.

Applicable Platforms

Not Language-Specific

Security Training

Train your team to recognize and prevent security threats with our comprehensive security awareness program.

Start Training

Vulnerability Scanning

Discover vulnerabilities in your applications and infrastructure before attackers do.

Scan Now